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IMAGINA TIVITY 
Calvin Seerveld 
Traditional philosophical uneasiness with imagining activity is documented. The reason 
adduced for the ontological homelessness of imagination is the inability of most philos-
ophers to recognize the irreducible nature and function of imaginativity. 
Imagining is then distinguished from sense-perceiving. imaging. and conceptual activity. 
Imagining, it is proposed, is the reality of making-believe; and such human, as-if func-
tioning can both (I) characterize human deeds as imaginative acts. and (2) be a latent or 
active functional moment within other kinds of human acts. 
Why God. creational ordinances, angels. and all earthly creatures can be imaginated is 
expounded, along with an analysis of such activity. its norm. and imaginative re'>ults 
huch as art). Remarks on relations of imagining to science and faith conclude the piece. 
This brief paper attempts to stake out a reliable idea of imaginativity. First, 
pivotal errors of traditional retlection on "imagination" are interpreted. Second, 
I try to distinguish and describe imagining as an irreducible sort of bodily human 
activity. Then, from my ontological vantage point I sketch how the various 
categorial coordinates give a specific, cosmological and historical setting to 
imaginative acts, events, and objects. Finally a few open-ended remarks will be 
offered on the important meaning of imaginativity and imaginative functioning 
for a full-orbed human life in God's world where Christ's Rule is acoming. 
Traditional Philosophical Context 
Imagining activity has often been disparaged by Western philosophers, as if 
imagination were a mental intluenza. I Mature Plato codified in his dialogues a 
way of thinking that left all image-making activity disqualified. Both elxaa{a 
(fashioning a likeness of material objects-e[xove<;, icons or models) and <l>av-
'maia (conjuring up imaginary appearances----ij>avTaal-'-aTa, illusions or mir-
ages) are mimetic skills, in Plato's judgment, that deceive TeXVTj a1TaTTjTLx'T'\). 
To image something is to make an artefact that seems to be what it isn't. A 
painterly image of a bed is comparable to the bells heard ringing in your head 
that are not there. 2 Both making images eLowAa) and lookalikes, and fancying 
imaginary things, says Plato, only have place in a just society if their products 
teach theistic, polis morality to those who waste their time on them. 3 
Aristotle countered Plato's position because unlike Plato Aristotle trusted 
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&fcr\tllcrL<; to be true. <PuvTO~criu for Aristotle was a sensitive ability which can 
rehearse sensational activity and carry on the production of images 
(<t>uV'TcXcrfLU'TU) even without external stimuli. In thinking animals <t>uv'Tucriu 
130lJAevTLxT] not only records phantasmic images of singular matters like acts of 
bravery, but human <t>uv'Tucriu is also active in forming image-patterns which 
aid the intellect in constructing concepts like "bravery." So Aristotle credits 
<t>uv'Tucriu with a pictorial, memorial character and with the function of mediating 
sensory and conceptual activity. 4 Image-forming becomes a very ordinary link 
in knowing activity. Thomas Aquinas substantially adopted Aristotle's position 
on imagination, even for prophetic knowledge (which does, however, take a 
special afflatus of God); only St. Paul's raptured intellection of God's essence 
lacked images. 5 
Kant recognized the normal integration of multiple sense impressions in cog-
nitive acts, and attributed such schematic unifying activity to our imaging-power 
(Einbildungskraft). Human imaging-power is reproductive, he claimed, that is, 
reproduces images (Vorstellungen) of phenomena according to empirical laws 
of association. But human imaging-power is also productive and transcendental, 
says Kant; that is, imaging-power is apriori and guarantees that its synthesizing 
ability is constitutive for knowing experience. 6 Kant's most important contribu-
tion, however, comes in the Kritik der UrteilskraJt (1790) where he develops 
the conception of productive Einbildungskraft. Productive imaging-power tran-
scends natural affairs when it presents aesthetic ideas. Aesthetic ideas are mental 
pictures pregnant with so many thoughts that no concept or word can explain or 
express what so genially stimulates all our feelings and interacting cognitive 
faculties. Such productive imaging-power, says Kant, is playful, satisfying, 
creative, and generates the fine arts, but it no longer affords us knowledge of 
reality.7 
Coleridge is a solid figure among Romantic Idealists who followed Kant's 
lead without Kant's restrictions. 8 Although the systematics of Coleridge's map 
of human mental powers is open to dispute,9 Coleridge clearly highlights three 
features he believes operate in the conjoined sense-understanding-reason experi-
ence of human creatures. (l) Primary imagination is a basic act of sustained, 
self-conscious perception of things. (2) Fancy is a mode of memory that is 
selective in its choice of timed and located sense impressions. (3) A secondary 
imagination is an essentially vital and transforming power which dissolves con-
figurations in order to recreate, to idealize and unify ... a synthetic and magical 
power which reveals itself in the reconciliation of opposite or discordant qual-
ities.1O It is this secondary (esemplastic) imagination-power as source of ideal, 
representative, and generic insights, where poetry and philosophy appear to 
coalesce, 11 which other thinkers like Schelling (intellektuelle Anschauung) were 
trying to identify too, as a supreme human act. Imagination for many secularized 
Romantic artists and poets as well as theorists comes close to being a revelatory, 
certified gnosis. 
Different current theologians who are fighting old-style, rationalistic dogmatics 
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seem to latch onto the Romantic lead with imagination. Mennonite Gordon D. 
Kaufman recommends theological imagination as a way for us to be freed from 
the yoke of our sense-perceptional base and to relativize idolatrous attachments 
on earth. Man does not live by phenomenal bread realities alone; we humans 
live by "systems of symbols," a vision of life. And a continuing, critical, imag-
inative update on "God" wilI with "greater effectiveness orient contemporary 
and future human life."12 The Roman catholic David Tracy avoids such a 
heterodoxical "inner light" theology of adjustment. But Tracy, citing Paul 
Ricoeur, approves of imagination as the intensifying power needed within a text 
to make it classic and therefore, presto! the logos of an authentic moment of 
truth, no matter from what particular tradition the writing stems. n Tracy seems 
to trust an analogical imagination rather than the old-time reason of philosophia 
perennis to unite all comers into a conversation that will necessarily approach 
truth. 
Most philosophers today credit human imaginative activity with much less 
promise. Edward Casey has made a careful attempt to give "imagining" its 
ontological due, rather than overrate it or leave it shuttlecocked in epistemological 
limbo. His phenomenological analysis details pairs of traits Casey thinks are 
essential to the (eidetic) structure of imagining. Imagining shows a surprising 
effortlessness; one has complete control of beginning and of terminating the 
process. Imaginings have a character of sheer, pellucid appearance based on 
self-contained delimitation. Imagining imputes pure possibility to the imaginatum 
and surrounds the imagined content and its mini-world of supposal with an 
imaginal margin that makes it intrinsically indeterminate. 14 "Imagining is enter-
taining oneself with what is purely possible," says Casey. 15 And he continues to 
isolate various modes of imagining acts with great precision from acts of perceiv-
ing, so that the autonomy of imagining comes into convincing focus. The problem, 
however, is that key questions as to why humans possess the remarkable power 
to initiate imagining and what imagining as a non-corrigible act means for the 
world of perception and action which imagining "decommissions"-such prob-
lems are declared out of bounds. I" 
What has plagued Western philosophers in their attempts to come to conceptual 
grips with the reality of human imaginative activity is an over-simplified epis-
temological problematics based on various dichotomistic or bifurcated 
anthropologies. A "body-soul-spirit" conception of man translates into a "sense 
perception-understanding-noetic reason" partitioned theory of knowledge. Such 
schemes, whether hierarchically ordered or monistically enmeshed, tend to keep 
"imagination" onto logically homeless or a prime candidate for a category mistake. 
The Platonic tradition treats imaginative activity as a perceptual error and 
therefore condemns images as illusions. The Aristotelian complex locates imag-
inative activity snugly within the workings of a sense based, complicated ration-
ality and assigns it a modest, shadowy place close to memory; "imagining" is 
understood to be a constructive imaging ability. The fact that Kant comes to 
probe productive Einbildungskraft in the matrix of aesthetic judgment is signif-
46 Faith and Philosophy 
icant. Although Kant denies outright any knowledge content to imaginative 
activity, Kant does, when he explains "imagining," point to the innovative and 
fanciful gift of "invention" long credited to poets and artists. The marks of free 
play and a world of semblance (Schein) fashioned for lingering attention hover 
around Kant's contribution to a sound idea on the nature of imagining. Romantic 
Idealist thinkers commit the error of conceiving imaginative activity to be a 
supralogical, illuminating oracle of truth. Casey's meticulous study succeeds 
with an almost antiseptic precision, when it distinguishes "imaging" from "im-
agining;" but Casey's analysis fails, I think, to differentiate (non-sensory) "im-
agining" from some form of conceptual intellection. "17 
Imagining as an Irreducible Function 
We would do well to identify "imagining" as a mode of human functioning 
which is irreducible and to distinguish imagining from other kinds of human 
functioning, such as sense perceiving or image constructing or conceptual func-
tioning. The confusion of imagining with sensing and imaging or concept-forming 
has obscured the specific, bona fide and particular glory of imagining in a normal 
human life. The terminological confusion alone in common parlance, W along 
with the Platonic prejudice, has hurt attempts to give "imagining" a fair hearing. 
Let us understand the "imagining" function of a man or woman to be the 
reality of making-believe. Sometimes that imaginative function of fancying or 
pretending stands out, and we can talk of imagining as an action. When children 
play bears, they make-believe they are bears. Such an imagining act is not an 
hallucination; children playing bears do not see themselves as bears. If a child 
were to sense-perceive his fellow playmates as bears, he or she would be suffering 
from a psychic disturbance, a delusion, because imaginata are simply not sensa. 
The human functioning of "imagining" is also distinct from an "imaging" 
function. It is necessary to be clear about "images." A retinal image (Abbild) 
is a Gestalt formed on the sensitive retina or eardrum of somebody. An image 
proper (Bild) is a picture (remembered) or a tune running through one's head 
that is not being sensed at the time. Proper images and harkenings (Bilder) 
assume certain sense abilities but are constructions which do not depend upon 
and are not actual sense-perceived, retinal images (Abbilder). When someone 
muses in early spring and imagines that the returning birds in the trees are angels 
and the squirrels are demons, one can make-believe that is so without imaging 
robins and cardinals to be angels. To pretend the two squirrels which munch my 
beloved strawberry plant to bits are minor devils is something different than 
imaging (afortiori, retinal-imaging) them to be visible devils. One might call the 
end result of such springtime imagining to be aural or visual fictions, to keep 
imaginata distinct from images (Bilder). Fictions may be the stronger if they 
are backed up by graphic images, and images may be more vivid if they have 
been earlier serviced by intense, retinal sights or eardrum sounds; but the fictions 
of whimsical tomfoolery embody unheard of and invisible subtleties which images 
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(Bilder) lack and retinal images (Abbilder) may be incapable of. Pretended bears 
are not bear images. Playing bears open up a world of virtuality that goes beyond 
the construction of images. "Imagining" is like mimicry: "imaging" is like making 
an imitation. 
The human function of "imagining" is also different than a "concept-forming" 
function. Imaginative functioning does not show traits of thinking through a state 
of affairs or of accounting sufficiently for the identity of something. Imaginative 
functioning has an as !fcharacter and delights in ambiguity, hidden resemblances, 
concealed surprises. If I imagine myself to be Napoleon, I do not consider 
whether I be a good instantiation of a typical megalomaniac, evidencing the 
characteristics definitive of such a limited class. Rather, I amuse myself and 
perhaps others by assuming the guise of certain dictatorial powers and gestures. 
My imaginative act of pretending to be Napoleon, like playing bears, may suggest 
certain whimsical features to an observer who not only sees and thinks and 
follows the imaged mannerisms but also imagines along receptively with my 
make-believe. My imaginative act may help such a secondary imaginer come to 
know certain fine features often concealed in personalities who achieve the status 
to indulge their authoritarian whims. But "imagining" is not argumentative, 
"making a case." Imaginative functioning has the nature of oblique presentation 
(Vorstellung) and works on human consciousness with the hidden surprises which 
are characteristic of metaphor. 
I do not wish to deny that every kind of human act harbours an imagining 
function within its peculiar confines, even if the imagining does not stand out. 
Human acts like speaking and thinking and believing and initiating corrective 
justice can be done with that moment of imaginativity actively enriching its 
performance, or without that quality showing. When the imagining function 
dominates and characterizes the very act in question as an imaginative act, as 
in playing bears or pretending to be Napoleon, analysis will show a very complex 
range of other human functions submerged within and coloured by that imagina-
tive act. Further, imaginative acts can sometimes be incapsulated, as it were, 
into habitats or settings that are not first of all imaginative operations, such as 
the liturgical ceremonies within a church worship activity or diplomatic man-
euvers within negotiations between governments. All these complexities bear 
scrutiny and sorting out. But the first point needed to bring order into all the 
analysis is this: imagining is a function with an irreducible ontic structure. 
"Imagining" is not psychic or technoformative in nature, is not at core semantic 
or conceptual, is not essentially social or confessional. 19 The prime mode of 
creaturely existence which determines the nuclear kind of functioning we may 
call "imagining" is, as I see it, the aesthetic aspect of God's creatures. 
Cosmic Setting for Functional Imaginative Reality 
What is able to be imagined by human creatures? 
Imaginativable. 2o In my judgment God, in so far as God is revealed in the 
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Scriptures and disclosed in creaturely reality, is properly open to acts of our 
imagining. The biblical prophets and Christ's parables make-believe God the 
LORD is a judge (Genesis 18:25, Judges 11:27, Psalm 75:7), rock (I Samuel 
2:2, Isaiah 17:10, Psalm 95:1-2, I Corinthians 10:1-5), a nursing mother (Isaiah 
49:13-17), husband (Hosea 2:7ff), bridegroom (Christ, Matthew 25:1-13), land-
lord-banker (Matthew 25:14-30), and hen (Christ, Luke 13:31-35). It is entirely 
proper to imagine God to be like something we creatures are acquainted with. 
If the imagined comparison is biblically insightful, the fiction will provide a 
nuanced knowledge of God's almighty, redemptive Rule in our lives. The merciful 
sternness of the holy LORD, God's covenanted nurturing us from childhood on, 
God as betrothed lover, as brooding mother hen, as entruster of freedom-giving 
responsibility-such make-believe Vorstellungen with respect to God, by Augus-
tine, Meister Eckhart, and countless poets and artists in varying grades of taste 
and wisdom throughout the ages, show that God is imaginativable. The fact that 
God is able to be imagined does not mean, however, either that God is an 
imaginatum or that God's imaginativability provides the inside track or comer 
on knowing God. Who God is creaturely like is but one way the revealing LORD 
is accessible to human nature. 
God's rainbow of laws holding for creaturely kinds of things, in so far as 
discoverable in the world, are also open to Scripturally led imagining. God's 
ordinances are not subject to temporality because God's law-Word constitutes 
the very temporal limits of creatures, their ordered kinds of duration-to-the-end. 
Creatures are dated and change. God's ordering Word and Will, as God's self, 
neither ages nor is subject to change, but provides for the cosmic genesis and 
ordained passage of creatures in history. However, the psychic law, for example, 
that intimacy with another is not wholesomely possible without a person's first 
feeling sure of self-identity can be imaginatively caught by a whimsical author 
like Mark Twain and portrayed in The Adventures of Tom Sawyer (1876), how 
Tom and Becky explore one another as girl and boy. Or the ethical law, for 
example, that broken troth blocks or destroys other facets of human life can be 
imaginatively investigated and prehended by a christian author, Alan Paton, and 
be presented in Too Late the Phalarope (1953). Such imaginative knowledge 
about the ways our on-going creaturely life is structured is very valuable, even 
though it is not the key to emotional health or the normative progression of a 
marriage. 
Heavenly creatures and their ongoing ministrations, in so far as revealed by 
the Scriptures to human readers, can also be approached with imaginative atten-
tion. Christ in storytelling imagines how devils play at faking an exit only to 
return after the feint with vengeance (Luke 11: 14-26). The Screwtape Letters 
(1942) represents devils in all their petty deviousness, and C. S. Lewis's Christian 
imagining lightheartedly probes them and furnishes fine knowledge on tempta-
tions occasioned by real devils. One should note: although the fantasy world of 
gnomes and fairies is ontologically similar to the imaginative fabric of Goethe's 
Faust (1808-32) and Milton's Paradise Lost (1667), the realities for which Snow 
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White and the Seven Dwarfs are the imaginata are childlike whims and industrial 
virtues, not devils, angels, and the abyss of human sin. 
The bulk of what is imaginativable is to be found among earthly creatures and 
all their continual changes as the world suffers and moves onward, waiting for 
the redemption of our bodily human nature and the final coming of Jesus Christ 
(cf Romans 8: 19-23, II Thessalonians 1 :3-10). The nuances 21 (=aesthetic object-
functions) and suggestion-rich properties (=aesthetic subject-functions) of pri-
mary states of affairs-things, acts, and events--can be captured by imagining 
subjects. All the relations of happenings and the multiple qualities of single 
creatures, groups, and institutional bon dings given or becoming given in the 
world can be cast (vorstellt) in an imaginative light. Artefacts made by humans 
(for example, transportational devices) or animals (nests) or trees (fruit) or glaciers 
(aftermath of rock-strewn terrain), and their alterations, also can be approached 
imaginatively. It is the half visible and partly audible, quasi sensible and configur-
able, imaginativable glories of earthly creaturely reality that are the stuff musing 
fancies are made on. Such nuanceful matters are also the loci where artists gather 
In meaning. 
Human imaginative act. When the imagining function of making-believe frames 
a certain human doing, we may call the activity an imaginative act. Artistic 
activity is an act of imaginativity par excellence, and assumes a measure of 
maturing skill to fix the as if treatment of whatever one is busy with imaginatively 
in a medium that objectifies the nuanceful meaning which is fascinating the artist 
at the time. But ordinary joking and treasure-hunt adventures and playing games 
like pretending you are bears or Napoleon are all bona fide imagining acts, even 
though they may come and go with lightning speed in the course of one's pellmell 
round of existence. 
An imaginative act of anybody takes place in a full-bodied complement of 
human functionality. A person who is imaginatively focused in action normally 
depends upon afertile memory. It is a working condition behind one's imagining 
activity that one's imaging ability be stocked with intuited awarenesses of striking 
past traits as well as futural glints of interesting matters all of which inhere in 
the present. One's gift for configured feelings and for ability to imitate or recall 
experienced images needs to be primed, as it were, to spill over into new 
constellations when one begins an imagining act. 
An empathetic sensitivity is another underground function supportive of any-
body's imagining activity. A flaccid sensibility drags down the fun of playing 
bears. But if one has developed a lively feeling power to sneak into crevices of 
hidden quirks waiting to be nuancefully felt (Einfiihlung), then one's playing 
bears prospers. A free-wheeling association of ambiguities half-sensed and 
delightedly perceived percolates in one's consciousness and effectively gives 
buoyancy to any imagining activity. 
The same is so for a person's basic physical and organic functionality: a kind 
of impulsive vitality and spontaneous physicality are corporeally necessary for 
imagining to flourish. A physically wasted person or elderly patient whose 
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biophysical life processes as a whole are only marginal or severely malfunctioning 
will have trouble rising above such handicaps to be busy imaginatively. Muscle 
tone and healthy reflexes are normal preconditions for somebody to play bears. 
Empathy, remembered imaging, impulsivity, and laughing spontaneity are not 
imagining functions. Empathy is a feeling; imaging is a formative function; 
impulsivity is organic, and a laughing spontaneity is downright physical by 
nature. But empathy, imaging, impulsivity, and a concentrated physical spon-
taneity awaiting release are emotional, formative, organic, and physical functions 
of one's corporeal reality, deepened, if you will, aesthetically. And such aesthet-
ically impregnated and enriched emotional, formative, organic, and physical 
functionings are normally necessary (but not sufficient) conditions supporting 
anybody's ordinary imaginative action. 
An imaginative act in which one pretends to be like something else or makes-
believe squirrels are devils or a woman is a submarine probably comes to be in 
stages. It is difficult to discern exactly whether to count a person's active whim-
sicality as a state of simply being in "good spirits" prior to becoming imaginatively 
busy or read it as an early step that builds up to a full imaginative act. It may 
not make much difference. But whimsicality, a predisposition to laughter, and 
a demeanor brimming with fun, an attitude of playfulness, on the lookout for 
fanciful surprises: all such elementary aesthetic functionings-frolicking among 
nuances, so to speak-are constitutive moments within an imaginative act. The 
presence and coalescence of a mimic playfulness and fantasy are certainly critical 
in the becoming of an imaginative act. Playfulness and pretending as if may 
even be the minimal sine qua non, sufficient conditions for a given act to be 
qualified by an imagining function. 
The singular, determinative feature of a human creature's imaginative act may 
be best described perhaps as a simulation of strange affairs. The core of being 
busy imaginatively is to be discovering resemblances of some odd-appropriate 
sort that remain allusive but compel attention and elliptically present metaphoric 
insight. Women whose vulnerable, bodily cavities give security, birth, and life 
to children can also be places of great strength and protection for their babies 
once outside in the world. An underwater submarine proceeds stealthily in 
dangerous water. If it must surface and raise its periscope, it does so warily. A 
human mother, a ponderous human Mother Earth, alarmed at the murder and 
destitution of countless children in the world, might rear up startled and vulner-
able, rigid periscopic neck, adamant head, piercing eye, and look fixedly to see 
where her mighty limbs and massive care are needed. One is imagining about 
the earthy role of woman and the prospects of mortal danger for her offspring 
when one juxtaposes with intriguing ambiguity a mother earth figure and a 
periscope on guard. As a professional imaginator Henry Moore has also carved 
such a simulation into a fiction composed of five metres of Travertine marble. 
The imaginative act of a human subject22 is always situated and dated, cir-
cumstantial, within a personal life history, formed by a larger-than-individual 
tradition, set in a society with a cultural matrix of one spirit or another where 
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cross-currents of historical retreat and development in all these many facets and 
more are constantly impinging upon what creatures do. Imagining acts admit of 
differences in quality. "My love is like a rose," is an inscription of a fiction that 
has less aesthetic staying power than the line, "My luv is like a red, red rose." 
When imaginative acts are sturdy and rich, ranging widely and mature, they 
show coefficients of expressivity, wit, entertainment, irony, festivity, and many 
more (analogical) functions. When someone's imaginative attempt is thin, under-
developed, or stillborn, the imagining reverts quite easily to what is trite, fol-
lowing the proper form but without the ludic spark. It is even possible for 
imagining acts to be denatured while the person carries on with it. A stunted 
imagining may stem from the fact that one's openness to imaginative activity 
was closed down by others, repressed or curtailed because imagining was con-
sidered to be an irrational or unredemptive waste of time. The anomaly is, 
however, that often zany people, neurotic, irreverent, socially maladjusted and 
sceptical, may still be richly endowed with imaginating gifts. 
God's calling for imaginativity. There is a creational law of God which holds 
for the human exercise of imaginativity, just as there are callings of God for 
other modes of functional activity. All the various creational ordinances spoken 
by God hold firm during changing times for the many different creatural subjects; 
each calling holds according to its kind. Any such modal law needs to be followed 
by a human subject who intends to be meaningful in that certain way of acting. 23 
For anybody to follow a modal law calling of God is a different matter than 
for one to be obedient in the directional Way of life or death. The command of 
God, "Love me above everything-my Rule first!-and your neighbour as your-
self' (Deuteronomy 6:4-7, Matthew 6:33-34, Romans 13:8-10) is put to the 
hearted human creature; and if man or woman has not been moved by the Holy 
Spirit to obey that directive, adopted in Jesus Christ by God's grace, that person 
remains sinfully headed toward the creatural end of death (Deuteronomy 30: 11-
20, Ephesians 2:9-10). So humans respond to creational ordinances basically in 
a godly or in a godless way, that is, with their heart open or closed to the 
direction of the Holy Spirit. Therefore it is possible for a human creature to be 
misdirectedly busy even if he or she follows the various modal law callings with 
brilliance. 
The relation between God's directional command of love and God's various 
modal callings under which and within which we human subjects severally 
function is construed by the responsible human task of issuing imperatives, in 
order to disclose the way we may find obedient modal meaning. This is a foremost 
human office: to show what it means to love the LORD in this or that modal 
way, how to respond obediently as God's subject in following this or that kind 
of calling. 
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A possible way to fonnulate the (aesthetic) imperative for imagining function-
ality and imaginating activity of human creatures is this: note or present or 
perfonn the nuances there be playfully; present what a given state of affairs is 
like; transform dissimilars into a similative surprise; and do this as praise of 
God, with care for things, in winsome service to all and sundry. 
Such an imperative for matters imaginative would be, I believe, if enacted by 
human subjects, a harbinger of blessing. The imperative holds for playing bears, 
for imagining bird songs are angel voices, for catching the nuance of a mother 
on submarine alert for her kids, for composing love songs with a Scottish burr, 
for the functioning of imagining wherever it isotopically lurks in the existential 
human makeup. This aesthetic imperative for all matters of imaginativity occurs 
in an interrelated mesh with many other imperatives for all the other kinds of 
callings we creatures have. And the imperatives relevant for callings diverse 
from imaginativity hold simultaneously on the person who for the nonce happens 
to be imaginating. 
The particular law for imaginativity can be not met through ignorance or 
incapacity. Some people get carried away with the similitude and start to bite 
people when they play bears. Others miss the happy ingenuity of being compared 
to a submarine and are offended, as if their anatomy is under critique. Still 
another may question your biblical orthodoxy in comparing birds to angels 
because they miss the humorous play in the simile. Such offended, people-biting 
literalists do not know how to be imaginative. 24 In games they are called "poor 
sports." In daily concourse they may be dour, no-nonsense people who simply 
lack a lilt of joy to their life. They are not mean-spirited so much as void of 
make-believe; but unimaginative people often become serious kill-joys on the 
loose. 
The particular calling of God for imaginativity can also be willfully violated. 
When people imagine and do it purposely without constraints, as if such activity 
were a law and domain to itself, autonomous, then imaginative activity becomes 
ugly and brutal in a self-preening sort of idolatry. The dandy who commits 
himself to live totally within imaginative splendour and regards unsophisticated 
folk as untouchables, such a usurpation by imagining activity of human life, 
which is subject to many other legitimate imperatives, brings with it a loveless 
quality of fevered, consuming preciosity that is both raffine and effete. Whenever 
one indulges one's imaginative (or analytic or emotional or whatever) subjectivity 
not as a response to a cosmic calling but as a prerogative anchored in oneself, 
cultural ruin is at hand. The closed world of haute couture today, for example, 
is largely an expression ("suppression") of imagining in unrighteousness: exploi-
tive, demeaning, ludicrous. The perversity of evil imagining and its curse upon 
creatures is not always the blatant lie of a cleverly tempting porno film that will 
destroy the play of erotic love and manipulate the flesh of victims; sometimes 
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the imaginating Lie is an insidious godlessness that induces one to enter an 
alluring labyrinth only to seal one up in a mesmerized ennui. Imaginative seduc-
tion is sinful and destructive as well as imaginating rape. 
Christians can posit mistaken imperatives for a given area of creation, such 
as imaginativity. Secular disbelievers in Jesus Christ can posit fairly correct 
imperatives for a given area of human activity. Even when theorists deny the 
existence of God's lawful callings as structured ways within which God com-
mands an obedient response of praise and neighbourly love, care and fruitful 
cultivating of the earth, anyone who recognizes, for example, that imaginativity 
has a nature of its own or some kind of identity, must and usually does fabricate 
an (ontological) rationale for imaginating that meets the mark (whatever it is) 
or doesn't. In my jUdgment, even an old-fashioned positivist or a serious 
phenomenologist who intends merely to describe the marks which define pure 
cases of "imagining," is appealing to some kind of enduring order. That such 
order of interwoven, irreducible ways-of-being-there is God's structuring Word 
spoken in love for our creaturely good is an article of faith that shapes a biblically 
Christian philosophical systematics. 
lmaginata. The kind of entities which result from imaginating acts I called 
fictions. The distillate of brief, human imaginative acts may be fleeting imagin-
ings, so fleeting or provisional a conscious hold on certain prehended nuances 
that the Vorstellung gets lost in the jumble of feelings, concepts, images, signs, 
concerns and beliefs that are constantly in one's consciousness. But musings 
and fancies, similes and graphic metaphors-imaginata~eserve recognition of 
their distinct identity. A fiction is a nuanceful or aesthetic object in the way that 
concepts are analytic objects and words are semantic objects: results of human 
activity whose particular existence is defined by object-functionality. Concepts 
exist to be thought; words exist to be spoken; fictions exist to be imagined. It 
is so that imaginata are also thinkable and discussable, as well as (un)believable 
or copyrightable. But fictions, which are at core metaphoric similations, cannot 
be concept-straightened out or paraphrased exactly, tested as certitudes or 
exhausted as legal tender. Fictions are aesthetic modal objects in the press of 
life and embody their own peculiar kind of congealed knowledge and glory. 
Artworks are a complicated sort of fiction in which the imaginative qualification 
has received crafted underpinnings in a medium that seems to provide a more 
independent entity-character to artworks than aesthetic objects enjoy. Artworks 
last beyond a circumstantial setting in ways that occasional imaginata do not. 
A discussion of such problems in the theory of artistry lies beyond the scope of 
this paper. It will also be important to test the thesis that while fictions easily 
subsume images and sensa, fictions do not depend upon semantic signs or distinct 
concepts for their integrity as fictions, because clarity and non-contradictory 
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identifications dispel the penumbras of underexposed and overexposed hints and 
allusions fictions need. 
Relational Meaning of lmaginativity 
Just as language is not merely a convenient instrument for theoretical thinking 
but represents itself an important way humans exist historically in the world, 
each with a mother tongue, so imaginativity is not simply a quirk of the artistic 
personality which helps the artist write poetry, but is an important way men and 
women exist historically in the world. Our imaginating reality is not the center 
of human meaning, but imaginativity is as relatively fundamental in import for 
human life as our gift of speech. The world of music, literature, painting and 
sculpture, choreographic dance, architectural design, theatre, song, and much 
more artistry depends upon and is generated by the imaginating responsibility 
given to human nature. But even before the world of artistry-which in our day 
is cruelly burdened by being split into an elitist tradition for the initiated and a 
pop art for the historically uninformed masses-prior to the world of artistry 
which affects everyone's livelihood with its presence and quality of specially 
constructed sight and sound fictions, there is the fund of imaginata into which 
each person enters in' his or her time, the fund of imaginata which one alters 
and carries along unconsciously from day to day. The sort of Vorstellullgen 
which inhabit us, the integrity and calibre of the "symbols" we subliminally live 
by, the versatility of our imagining functionality, and the exercised openness we 
have to the incredible wealth of imaginativables in the world (the aesthetic 
object-functions of non-human creaturely reality), all drastically shape the rich-
ness or poverty and texture of one's human disposition and well-being. 
The imagining functional dimension to other kinds of human acts testifies of 
the relational meaning of imaginativity, its adverbial service one might call it. 
For example, thinking done imaginatively will thrive on suppositions, while 
thinking that lacks imaginativity will tend to shun the worth of probabilities. 
Edward Casey's analysis of "imagining-that," instead of defining imagining 
proper, is actually pointing to the imagining moment within thinking, a thinking 
common to modal logic, he says, and its projection of possible worlds, where 
contrary-to-fact distinctions are thought through and analytic postulates are 
made. 25 As-if thinking or hypothetic activity often sparks scientific exploration, 
and underlies much of what passes for "original" thinking. Polanyi's term for 
the function of a thinking act in touch with indeterminate reality is "intellectual 
passions," and thinking informed by intellectual passions selects facts that are 
"interesting," providing a valuable, heuristic service in scientific examination. 26 
I too understand conceptual guessing and the important hunch in human life to 
be the imagining function within analytic activity. Without that functional dimen-
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sion percolating in one's thinking, one's thinking will tend to lose play and 
become intellectually astigmatic, with blind spots, unable to identify what 
Maurice Cohen has called the "twilight zones" of reality which challenge concep-
tual activity to stay supple. 27 Arid thought happens when somebody (or even a 
school of philosophic thinkers) has let the imagining function within analysis 
atrophy. 
When the imagining functional quality of one's confessional life goes limp, 
aberrations occur in creedal activity. Confession of what Allah has done for your 
nation, for example, may become fanatically doctrinaire, without a ripple of 
ambiguity. Or sacraments may virtually disappear from one's church worship 
and be considered formalities one is obligated to perform, for their teaching 
content or emotional effects, but not as an act intrinsic to the well-being of a 
communal confession. 
When I believe-that "I am not my own but belong-body and soul, in life 
and in death-to my faithful Saviour Jesus Christ," I am bodily testifying (notitia) 
of the faith worked in my heart by the Holy Spirit (fiducia) to whom I have 
wholeheartedly committed myself (assensus). When I deliberately believe-in the 
LORD revealed by the holy Scriptures, I am bodily testifying (martyrion, tes-
timonium), directly recapitulating (modally) the faith rooting me centrally 
(fiducia) and to whose Giver I have entrusted myself (assensus). When the child 
of my body is ceremonially baptized in the name of the Father, the Son, and 
the Holy Spirit, I am believing-how, I am bodily confessing in a likeness (sym-
bolum) the covenanted assurance of salvation from sin deeply convicting me by 
Grace (fiducia), and to what kind of Lord I have pledged my heart (assensus). 
Ritually showing I "believe-how" the LORD deals with us creatures is a fully 
creedal act, ontologically possible because of the imagining functional dimension 
within the human credo. Sacramental and liturgical moments of confessional life 
find no substitute in piety, dogma, koinonia, sacrifice, prayer, or other features 
of a full-orbed, confessional profession of one's existential attachment to the 
true God or to any no-god. Without the imagining function at work in one's 
mode of belief, one's confessional edifying activity has lost a very subtle, con-
stitutive element. 
Much more could be said on the relational importance of imaginativity. At 
this juncture we can rest with the brief that imaginativity is the nucleus of an 
ontologically prime, functional aspect of reality. It makes historical and 
philosophically reforming sense to attribute the name "aesthetic" to such an 
irreducible mode of allusive reality-"making-believe." This "imagining" way 
of functioning and, upon occasion, of acting is an integral moment of our whole 
human existence coram Deo. We do well to accept the gift of imaginativity as 
an avenue for joy. 
institute for Christian Studies. Toronto 
IMA GINA TIVITY 57 
NOTES 
I. Edward S. Casey, Imagining, a Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1976), p.4. 
2. Plato, Sophista 240a7-241 e6, 263d6-266e2, and Respub/ica 507b2-51Ie5. 
3. Plato, Re.lpublica 606el-607a9, and Leges 903b4-9IOe4. 
4. Aristotle, De Anima, 427aI6-429a9, 433a9-434a22. 
5. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II-II q. 173, a.2-a.3, q.175, a.3-a.4. 
6. Immaneul Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, AI15-30. 
7. Immaneul Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraji, #49. 
R. Kant keeps genius subject to taste. Der Geschmack ist, so wie die Urteilskraft iiberhaupt, die 
Disziplin (oder Zucht) des Genies, beschneidet diesem sehr die Fliigel und macht es gesittet oder 
geschliffen. (Kritik der Urteilskraft, #50.2). 
9. S. V. Pradhan challenges Jackson's ranging "primary imagination" with Reason, "Coleridge's 
'Philocrisy' and his theory of Fancy and Secondary Imagination," Studies in Romanticism, 13 (no. 
3, Summer 1974): 247-48 n.31. Lloyd Davies follows Jackson on this point, "Coleridge on the 
Deduction of the Imagination" (unpublished Interdisciplinary Seminar paper, Institute for Christian 
Studies, Toronto, 1984), p.30. 
10. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, Ed. J. Shawcross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1981),1:202,2:12. 
11. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 2:19, 33-34. 
12. Gordon D. Kaufman. The Theological Imagination, Constructing the Concept of God (Philadel-
phia: Westminster Press. 1981), pp. 12.28-32,71-75. 
13. David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination (New York: Crossroad, 1981), pp. 128, 149 n.96. 
Cf. Henry Venema, "Analogical Pluralism: An appraisal of David Tracy's 'The Analogical Imagi-
nation'" (unpublished Interdisciplinary Seminar paper, Institute for Christian Studies, Toronto, 1984), 
pp. 10-12. 
14. Casey, Imagining, pp. 49-57, 68-70, 87-93, 96-101, 107-12. 
15.lbid.,p.119. 
16. Ibid., pp. 73, 189-91. 
17. Casey himself notices the problem; cf. Imagining, pp. 40-48, especially p. 43 n.8, and p. 227. 
18. P. F. Strawson, "Imagination and Perception," in Experience and Theory, Eds., Lawrence Foster 
and 1. W, Swanson (London: Duckworth Press, 1970), pp. 31, 53. Cf. also the earlier study by 
Gilbert Ryle, The Concept if Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), pp. 246-48,256-58,264-72. 
19. When a person says offhand, "I imagine you are trustworthy," it could mean various things. "I 
think you will reward trusting." "Ifeel you are okay," "My socialjudgment is that you are dependable," 
"I believe you are not deceptive," etc. Ordinary language is not always a good starting point for 
introducing the precision theoretical analysis requires. "Imagining" somebody to be trustworthy, 
strictly speaking now, would mean in the context of this essay: "I'll make-believe you are a reliable 
fellow. . let me play the villain." 
20. "Imaginativable" is a term that refers to anything extant that can be a real object of imagining 
activity. The "imaginativable" is not produced by or reducible to the subject's act of imagining. 
21. "Nuance" is a key term for me in describing that feature of reality which is peculiarly aesthetic. 
58 Faith and Philosophy 
"Nuance" refers straightforwardly to whatever is partially hidden and playful ("ludic"), elusive like 
subtle variations and delicate shadings. A synonym of "nuancefulness" is "allusivity." Cf. my 
Rainbows for the Fallen World, Aesthetic Life and Artistic Task (Toronto Tuppence Press, 1980), 
pp. 49-52, 131-35. 
22. Animals have an uncanny thought process, figuring out their survival, but they do not think out 
theories. Animals also sport about, and perhaps mimic a fellow creature (in a mating dance), but 
they do not narrate stories or write down metaphors. That is, animals may do animal thinking and 
animal imagining, but animals are not structured by selfhood and do not have the religious intention-
ality and responsibility which is inescapably at the heart of human acts. 
23. "Modal law" is a technical term referring to the structural ordinances God has set for different 
kinds of activities, for example, a law for thinking or a law for doing what is just. "Modal laws" 
are not "natural" laws, but are understood to be our Creator's specific callings for creatures to be 
God's royal subjects. Cf. my chapter on "Dooyeweerd's Legacy for Aesthetics: Modal Law Theory," 
in The Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd (University Press of America, 1985). 
24. For examples of this defect with respect to conversation, fairy tales, and one's confession of 
faith, cf. Rainbows for the Fallen World, pp. 52-59. 
25. Like Hans Vaihinger who dissociates "fiction" from "hypothesis" in Philosophy of "As if' (1911, 
translated by C. K. Ogden, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1924), pp. 81-95, Edward Casey 
differentiates "sheer supposing" from "hypothesizing" (imagining, pp. 48, 81,114-116). The rationale 
of both Casey and Vaihinger, however, uses the criterion that fictions have no relation to reality 
("sheer supposition"), while hypotheses are meant to be checked out against actual phenomenal 
facts. Such a position wrongly denies the fact that realities! are being imaginated in leading to 
imaginata. Cf. supra pp. 47-49. Kendall Walton's ingenious analysis of "fictional statements" and 
his proposal that "appreciators (of fictional worlds) are fictional" as well as "actual," in "How remote 
are fictional worlds from the real world?" The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 37 (no. 1, 
Fall 1978), pp. 20-21, is also troubled, I think, by the assumption that fictions lack real referents. 
Paul Ricoeur takes a different tack on "the referential values of metaphoric and, in general. symbolic 
expressions," in Interpretation Theon: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: The 
Texas Christian University Press, 1976), pp. 25-44. 
26. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (1958, New York: 
Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 134-36, 142-45, 150, 190. 
27. Morris Raphael Cohen, A Preface to Logic (1944. New York: Meridian Book, 1956): ..... there 
are elements of indetermination in the denotation of concepts . . .. the relative extent of 
illumined focal region and twilight or penumbral zone varies with different concepts ... " (p. 80). 
"Metaphors may thus be viewed as expressing the vague and confused but primal perception of 
identity which subsequent processes of discrimination transform into the clear assertion of an identity 
or common element (or relation) which the two different things possess" (p. 96). 
